TRUTH BIAS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISTRACTION
both false and true statements, rendering memory for the two kinds of statements more comparable. Third, while the original study only included one type of new statements in the memory test, we distinguished between aggravating, attenuating and neutral new statements, in order to test whether the attenuating or aggravating character of the false statements could per se affect their credibility. Fourth, a limitation of Gilbert and colleagues' (1993) studies was that while they assumed cognitive load to affect truth-bias, they did not test the correlation between the truth-bias effects and cognitive-load task performance. We measured participants' performance in the cognitive load task, in order to fully assess this relationship.
Dependent measures. 2
Judgments. For each perpetrator participants were asked to propose a prison term (0-5 years) and to report, on an 11-point scale: a general index of punishment severity (extremely light -extremely heavy), dangerousness (slightly dangerous -extremely dangerous), potentially beneficial contribution of psychological counseling (not at allextremely), probability of recidivism (not likely at all -extremely likely), and their feelings towards him (total indifference -total aversion).
Memory test.
All participants were presented with the same two lists of 24 statements, one for each report, and were instructed to decide whether each statement was present in the report (old) or not (new) and, if it appeared, whether it was true or false. 24 statements were presented in each list: 4 old true, 4 old false aggravating, 4 old false attenuating, 4 new aggravating, 4 new attenuating and 4 new neutral statements. For the aggravated version of each report, the four old attenuating statements of the list counted as attenuating new; conversely, for the attenuated version of each report, the four old aggravating statements of the list counted as aggravating new (see Table 1 
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Cognitive-load task performance. Performance in the task was measured as the absolute deviation of the number of avoir forms detected relative to the actual number. We tested correlations between cognitive-load task performance and the truth-bias judgments and memory measures.
Participants & Procedure
Gilbert and colleagues ' (1993) group × version critical interaction on participants' prison terms (operationalized as the mean difference of the terms for the aggravated and the attenuated perpetrators between the cognitive-load vs. control groups (n = 35)) corresponds to an f = .68. To replicate such a within-between interaction given two groups, two measurements and a correlation between repeated measurements of r =.30 (estimated from our pre-test) with .95 power 12 participants were needed (GPower; Faul, Buchner, Albertgeorge, & Buchner, 2007) . Gilbert et al. (1993) did not report the necessary information for a power analysis for the cognitive-load effect on memory. GPower suggests 40 participants for an (arbitrarily assumed) medium within-between interaction effect (f = .25) in the generalized linear mixed model that we used for memory responses, with an assumed repeated measures correlation of r = .5, given two groups, six measurements (corresponding to the 2 × 3 withinsubject interaction in our model) and a power of .95.
We tested 82 first year undergraduate psychology students at the Université libre de Bruxelles, compensated with course credits for their participation. We excluded 8 participants from subsequent analyses for one of the following reasons: They had participated in similar studies in the past (n = 3), failed to understand or to correctly follow the instructions (n = 2), were non-native speakers of French (n = 1), or the computer crashed during testing (n = 2).
Of the remaining 74 participants (37 in the cognitive-load and 37 in the control condition, resulting in a .99 power for both the judgment and memory analyses)TRUTH BIAS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISTRACTION Participants were tested in individual computer booths in groups of maximum 8. After signing an informed consent, they were given instructions describing their task. Participants were informed that the one speaker (e.g. male) provided truthful information, while the other, (e.g. female) provided false information, which was taken from other reports that are unrelated to the present cases (see supplementary materials for verbatim instructions).
Participants in the cognitive load condition were also instructed to count the number of every avoir form occurring in each report. All participants then listened first to Dimitri's and then to Etienne's report through headphones. The version order -aggravated-then-attenuated vs.
attenuated-then-aggravated -was counterbalanced across participants. Finally, participants filled-in an on-line questionnaire, whereby they were asked to judge the two perpetrators and to respond to the memory test. In the memory test, participants were first reminded which speaker provided the truthful and untruthful information, and were then presented with the two 24-statement lists, related to Dimitri's and Etienne's reports. The statement order in each list was randomized and kept constant across participants. Cognitively loaded participants were asked, at the beginning of the questionnaire, to report the number of avoir forms in each report.
Results
In all our experiments, outliers for the judgments analyses were excluded based on the median absolute deviation with a constant of 3 (Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, & Licata, 2013) 4 .
As we analyzed memory responses by means of a Generalized Linear Mixed Model for binomial data, we did not exclude outliers by subjects for the memory analyses. For correlational analyses, we used the whole sample. Effect sizes are reported for all pairwise comparisons based on Hedges' formula of Cohen's d, in order to avoid overestimates due to the correlated repeated measures of our mixed designs (see Dechene et al., 2010 Importantly, the three-way interaction signaled that despite these differences between the cognitive load and control group, the former did not seem to classify more false statements as new (t(3540 = .67, p = .501, d = .04, .20] Judgments-Memory relationship. We tested the correlation between the difference of the judgments for the two perpetrators and the percentage of false aggravating and attenuating statements participants misremembered as true. As expected, the more participants misremembered false statements as true the larger the impact of the false statements on their judgments was (r(74) = .36, p = .001). 
Discussion
Unlike in Gilbert and colleagues' seminal study (1993), distraction did not increase the impact that false statements had on participants' judgments. Additionally, although the cognitive-load task did tax participants' cognitive resources, impairing their identification of all kinds of statements -true, false and new -, it did not selectively affect their tendency to misclassify false statements as true. Thus, in our study the effects of cognitive load on participants' memory were more generalized, and not restricted to memory for the false statements.
Crucially, both groups confounded more false statements with true than true statements with false, and, in both groups, participants' judgments were influenced by false statements.
These effects indicate the operation of a strong truth-bias, for which cognitive load is not a necessary condition. Lack of significant correlations between performance in the cognitive load task and memory and judgment measures corroborates the idea that the truth-bias is 16 TRUTH BIAS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISTRACTION independent of cognitive load. At the same time, as in Gilbert and colleagues (1993) , memory and judgments correlated, suggesting that they constitute complementary and reliable indexes of the truth bias.
Although these results seem quite discrepant from those of the original study, in one of the experiments that Gilbert and colleagues ran (1993; Experiment 2) cognitive load increased not only participants' tendency to misremember false statements as true, but also their tendency to misremember them as new. Additionally, in those seminal studies there was also evidence that cognitive load increased participants' tendency to mistake new items for old true ones (Experiment 1), and true statements for new ones (Experiment 2). Thus, the tendency for cognitive load to more globally affect participants' performance in the memory test is not a completely novel finding.
It is worth emphasizing that our results were not driven by a general tendency to classify any item as true, as our participants misclassified more new statements as false than as true. This finding likely reflects the fact that in such memory tests participants partly judge the statements' truth-value driven by the statements' familiarity or processing fluency (Dechêne et al., 2010) . Under such a perspective, familiarity or fluency give an impression of truth, and as new statements are less familiar or fluent compared to both the true and the false old statements, participants may be biased towards judging new statements as false. Finally, the responses on the different types of new statements suggested that the aggravating and attenuating statements were more likely to be misclassified as false than the neutral ones, which indicates that the non-neutral content of the false statements did not render them especially believable. This last finding suggests that participants did not tend to judge the false statements as true merely because of their aggravating or attenuating content, but rather due to their high fluency or familiarity emerging from their past encounter.
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The results of Experiment 1, thus complement prior studies and attest to the existence of a strong truth-bias that is independent of cognitive load (Fiedler et al., 1996b; Marsh & Fazio, 2006) . While those studies suggested that cognitive load does not affect the truth-bias when participants rely on their own knowledge to reject inaccurate information, Experiment 1 showed that the same holds when participants have to rely on explicit truth-value metainformation. Since our paradigm differed in several aspects from that of Gilbert et al. (1993) , at this point it is unclear whether the same results can be replicated using the original visual paradigm. Experiment 2 tackles this issue.
Experiment 2

Method & Material
The design and materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1, but now the procedure was very similar to Gilbert et al.'s (1993; Experiment 1) , with true and false statements presented to the participants visually. We created one video for each report × version combination whereby the text of the reports crawled at a rate of 16 characters/second. The videos were presented using E-prime (2.0) and participants read aloud the two crime reports, while the text crawled on screen. In addition, to make this study as similar as possible to the original study, only the four measures employed by Gilbert and colleagues were used (dangerousness, potentially beneficial contribution of psychological counseling, probability of recidivism, and feelings towards perpetrators, while participants could now propose prison terms between 0-20 years.
Experiment 2 departed from the original study in three respects. First, while Gilbert and colleagues presented true statements in black and false in red font, we used green and red fonts respectively. Green and red are generally associated with concepts of truthfulness versus falsity, and additionally, this modification ensured that both kinds of statements were presented in non-default colors. TRUTH BIAS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISTRACTION Secondly, in order to measure the correlation between the truth-bias indexes and cognitive-load task performance, we slightly modified Gilbert and colleague's cognitive load manipulation, based on a task by Lavie (2006) . In the original study, participants under cognitive load had to press a button every time the digit '5' appeared on the screen, among a stream of digits crawling below the crawling report-text line. In our experiments, the digits now appeared in groups of 6 digits displayed in two rows (3 on the top 3 on the bottom) of an imaginary rectangular positioned below each false statement. Groups of digits appeared along with the first letter of a false statement and kept appearing every 2.500 ms until the last letter of a false statement disappeared. Participants had to press x every time the digit 5 was among the group of digits on the display and n otherwise. A pre-test had shown that the two letters were similarly related to positive and negative responses in the task.
Third, the memory test now assessed participants' memory of the truth-value metainformation, that is, statements' color, rather than explicit truth-value. Fragale and Heath (2004) have shown that people attribute information they believe to truthful sources. Accordingly, in this context participants are expected to assign the statements they believe the truthful tag (green color) and those they disbelieve the untruthful tag (red color). Color memory, thus allowed for an indirect measure of truth-value memory that could be immune to potential acquiescence effects and demand characteristics in the response phase.
Participants & Procedure
The procedure was similar to that in Experiment 1 except that participants were tested individually and read Etienne's (and not Dimitri's) report first. We tested 63 students at the Université libre de Bruxelles, rewarded with course credits. Twenty participants were excluded from the analyses because they were dyslexic (n = 3), non-native French speakers (n = 4), suspicious about the design (n = 1), incapable of reading the text aloud (n = 3) or of TRUTH BIAS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISTRACTION following the instructions (n = 5). Finally, four participants were excluded because E-prime crashed during the presentation phase. Data from 43 participants were finally analyzed (6 male, 37 female; 23 in the cognitive-load condition, 20 control).
Results
Judgments. 6.5% of the total responses were excluded as outliers. We ran the same model as in Experiment 1, but the prison term measure was now divided by two to be comparable to the other measures. As shown in Figure 4 , participants judged the perpetrator in the aggravated report more severely compared to the one in the attenuated report (F(1, 
Discussion
In line with Experiment 1, the judgment measures of Experiment 2 replicated a distraction-independent truth-bias, in a paradigm almost identical as that of Gilbert et al. (1993) . As for the memory task, we obtained analogous results to Experiment 1 even if truthvalue memory was now substituted for with truth-value meta-memory. This finding provides additional evidence for a genuine truth bias at the memory level that is not driven by task demands or social norms (see Dunning, Anderson, Schlösser, Ehlebracht, & Fetchenhauer, 2014 (Dechêne et al., 2010; Jacoby, 1991) .
In sum, Experiments 1 and 2 robustly demonstrated a truth bias, that emerged regardless of participants' cognitive load and was independent of distraction. The difference between our results and those by Gilbert et al. (1993) could be due to the slightly different stimuli (different language, different color for the true statements) or the slightly different distraction tasks we used. Note, however, that our material and paradigm, especially in the second experiment, were very close to those in their original study. Another possibility is that given the pervasive use of media and video games in the young generations today, our participants, 30 years later, may be much better at multitasking compared to Gilbert et al.'s participants. Thus, despite the overall cognitive-load effects on memory accuracy, the specific effects of cognitive load on the truth-bias may have been overshadowed in our studies.
In any event, the most important implication of our results for the misinformation effects in real-life is not the absence of a cognitive-load effect on the truth-bias, but rather the strength of the truth-bias even in the absence of a cognitive load. Our findings show that participants misremembered statements they knew to be false as true, in a context where they were expected to be vigilant. This finding suggests that the truth-bias may actually be 
The truth bias effect found in Experiments 1 and 2 was replicated in an orthogonal paradigm, with an equal number of true and false statements. This study, therefore, invalidates alternative explanations for our findings in these experiments. Given the results of Experiment 3, it is unlikely that participants tended to believe false statements to be true based on an implicit learning mechanism or a response strategy, triggered by a higher frequency of true statements in our previous paradigms.
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As regards the memory pattern on new statements, the present experiment largely replicates the finding of the previous ones. Once more, new statements tended more to be misclassified as false than as true. This finding provides additional evidence for the potential impact of processing fluency or familiarity on participants' responses in the memory test. On the other hand, in this experiment only the attenuating new statements, but not the aggravating ones, tended more to be misclassified as false compared to the neutral ones. At the same time, the aggravating statements were less misclassified as true than the neutral ones. These two findings combined, suggest once more that participants may have been somehow sensitive to the link in our material between aggravating and attenuating information on the one hand, and falsity on the other hand. Future studies could specifically test how judgments of truth for unlearned information may be affected by the known truth or falsity of previously learned information.
Taken together, Experiments 1-3 support the existence of a strong truth-bias, that occurs even in the absence of cognitive load and operates when statements are explicitly tagged as false. These studies, thus undermine the hypothesis that cognitive load or distraction constitute necessary conditions for the operation of the truth-bias. We leave the relevant implications to the general discussion. Before that, we report a final study, designed to determine whether the truth-bias critically depends on the way the true and false information is presented to participants.
Experiment 4 Design & Material
The primary goal of Experiment 4 was to test whether the truth bias is sensitive to the discrete statement presentation mode. Along the way, this experiment also tested whether some random characteristics, inherent in the false statements we used rendered them particularly believable. To this end, while in Experiments 1-3 each of the old statements was 27 TRUTH BIAS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISTRACTION presented as either true or as false, in this experiment all statements appeared both as true and as false across participants. Assessing error rates for each statement as a function of its truthvalue would now reveal any such random characteristics.
We created a short summary of the reports used in Experiment 1, based on a subset of the true statements of these reports. Each summary was accompanied by a list of the 12 old (the four true and eight false, four aggravating and four attenuating) statements included in the memory test of Experiment 1. As in many studies assessing truth-value judgments, these statements now appeared individually and sequentially, rather than in the form of a narrative.
Crucially, two lists were created for each report, and each of the statements was presented as true in the one list and false in the other list, while in each list half of the statements were presented as true and half as false. The orthogonal combination of the two lists for each report resulted in four final lists. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of these four lists (see Table 3 in the supplementary materials).
The memory test items were identical to those used in the previous experiments. Each report now included both aggravating and attenuating information, so that no judgment differences between report should be expected. However, we still included the prison term measure (0-10 years) and the general index of punishment severity (0-10 scale) to doublecheck that the reports of Etienne and Dimitri were equivalent.
Participants & Procedure
The same power analysis as in Experiment 3 applies for the detection of a memorybased truth-bias. Participants (N = 43; 34 female, 9 male) were recruited and tested as in the previous experiments. They received similar instructions, but now they were informed that they would read two short crime reports and several additional true and false statements concerning each of them. We used E-Prime (2.0) for the presentation of the report summaries and the accompanying statements. Participants first read the two summaries presented on the TRUTH BIAS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISTRACTION upper part of a computer screen, at their own reading pace. Next, they launched the presentation of the 12 additional true and false statements by pressing the spacebar.
Statements appeared individually, below the summary in a random order, accompanied by their truth-value tag (true or false), which was printed below them. In order to eliminate variation due to differences in reading styles or strategies, the duration of the presentation for each statement varied according to its length, and corresponded to a relatively slow reading rate of 16 characters/second (see Just, Carpenter, & Woolley, 1982) . Participants first read the report and statements related to Dimitri's crime and then those related to Etienne's crime.
Once they had finished reading the material, the two judgment questions appeared on the screen, followed by the memory task, in which statements appeared on the screen one at a time, in a random order, until participants gave their response (true, false or new).
Results
We used a mixed model to analyze participants' memory for the old statements, including the fixed factors classification and statements as in Experiment 1, and a third fixed factor, past presentation, that reflected each statements' truth-value in the previous experiments. Slopes of participants and items were included for each level of the classification factor.
Memory. The first hypothesis was whether the statements now presented as false would tend to be classified as true, regardless of their truth-value in the previous experiments (classification × statements interaction). Secondly, we were interested in whether the past false statements generally tended to be misclassified compared to the past true statements (classification × past presentation interaction). Mean classification percentage per statements is displayed in Figure 8 . There was a classification effect (F(2, 2886) = 46.12, p <.001) and a classification × past presentation interaction (F(2, 2886) = 11.33, p < .001). Overall, statements were more correctly classified than confounded (t(2886) = 8.43, p < .001, d = TRUTH BIAS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISTRACTION processing (see also Alves et al., 2015; Fessler, Pisor, & Navarrete, 2014 on positive vs. negative information processing). This differential processing may explain the enhanced memorability of the past false statements in the case of the present study. In any event, both memory patterns revealed for past false statements go against an alternative explanation of the truth-bias based on stimulus properties in the previous studies. If anything, in Experiments 1-3 the truth-bias was sufficiently strong to overshadow these tendencies.
General discussion
The chief objective of this article was to test if cognitive load is a necessary condition for the operation of truth-bias in a context where participants have to rely on external metainformation in order to show disbelief. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed a truth-bias operating in default situations, despite participants knowing that the statements they encountered were false, and being able to fully focus on their assessment. Our results, thus, corroborate Fiedler and colleagues '(1996a; 1996b) claim that the truth-bias is independent of cognitive load and show that this holds even when participants have available truth-value meta-information upon comprehension, and are explicitly urged to be vigilant.
These results strongly support the idea that people's cognitive resources during information encoding do not significantly determine the extent to which they will be truthbiased. As such, they undermine the 'automatic belief' model advanced by Gilbert and colleagues, (Gilbert et al. 1990; 1993) according to which the truth-bias occurs at the very moment people understand a piece of information. The independence of truth-bias from cognitive load suggests that the effect results from processes operating at a later stage, once participants have understood and stored the information. That is, the truth-bias is more likely due to dissociations of information from truth-value or source meta-information in memory, or constructive biases (see Fiedler et al., 1996b; Rapp, 2016) , rather than due to automatic TRUTH BIAS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISTRACTION belief upon comprehension (cf. Gilbert, 1991) .
This view of the truth-bias can actually compromise the extensive documentation of this effect with a strand of literature suggesting that people can automatically reject inaccurate information. Studies using implicit measures have shown that reading false statements interferes with positive responses in a Stroop-like or a lexical decision task (Hasson et al., 2005; Isberner & Richter, 2014; Richter et al., 2009) . Such interference effects suggest that people can, to some extent, automatically reject incoming information that they consider inaccurate. The possibility of automatic rejection can only be compromised with the operation of truth-bias, if the latter effect results from processes occurring after comprehension. Under this perspective, it would be perfectly possible for an individual to end up believing a statement she initially rejects upon comprehension. Future studies could test this hypothesis, by using a combination of measures of information assessment upon comprehension (e.g. a Stroop-like task), and post-comprehension measures of truth-bias.
A limitation of our studies is that they did not directly test the mechanism that underlies the truth-bias. We assessed the truth-bias via two inter-correlated measures, judgments and memory, each of which is likely to reflect a separate mechanism. The judgment-based truth-bias seems to be a clear instance of metacognitive myopia (Fiedler, 2012; Fiedler et al., 2015) , understood as the tendency to use large amounts of stimulus information, while being 'naive and almost blind regarding the history and validity of the stimulus data' (Fiedler, 2012, p. 2) . In this line Fiedler and colleagues (1996a) tested whether participants' judgments about a person are affected by questions they are asked, independently of the answers they give. In support of this hypothesis, if participants were asked whether a person is aggressive, they later tended to rate the person as aggressive, even though they initially denied that this was the case. These findings suggest that people are 33 TRUTH BIAS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISTRACTION affected by the semantic content of messages they receive, while they disregard the speech act within which the messages are embedded (e.g. a question, a negation etc). Our judgment results likely demonstrate similar effects of meta-cognitive myopia: participants ignored the meta-information signaling that the semantic content of the false statements was inaccurate, and used this semantic content to judge the perpetrators.
The second truth-bias index, memory, suggests that participants explicitly misremembered false information they encountered as true (Experiments 1 & 3) or as being related to meta-information signaling it is true (Experiment 2). This finding could be explained by a dual-process account like the one proposed for a closely related phenomenonthe illusory-truth-effect. The illusory-truth-effect reflects people's tendency to judge previously encountered information as more true than new information (Begg et al., 1992; Garcia-Marques, Silva, & Mello, 2016; Henkel & Mattson, 2011) . In a typical illusory-trutheffect study, participants first receive statements that are either true or false, and then complete a memory test containing old statements along with new statements. In such a memory test, participants' responses may be driven by two processes: on the one hand, by explicit memory for the source or truth-value of the encountered statements; and, on the other hand, by the statements' perceived familiarity (Begg et al., 1992) or processing fluency (Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Unkelbach, 2007; Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009) . A crucial aspect of this account is that old statements feel more familiar or are processed more fluently than new statements, and that this automatic feeling makes participants judge the former as truer than the latter (Dechene et al., 2009) . In a similar vein, our participants' tendency to classify false statements as true might be driven by feelings of familiarity or fluency. Since familiarity or fluency are relative measures, this interpretation of our results entails that participants to some extent compared the fluency or familiarity of old statements against that of new statements (see Dechene et al., 2009) . The finding in Experiment 1 that new statements were TRUTH BIAS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISTRACTION more likely to be misclassified as false than as true supports the possibility that participants to some extent compared old and new statements. In fact, this latter finding could be seen as the inverse of the truth-bias effect: not only are old statements more familiar or fluent than new ones, leading to the truth-bias; new statements are less familiar and fluent than old ones, and are thus, judged as false. Future studies could directly test this hypothesis by eliminating new items from the memory tests. False statements might then lack the fluency or familiarity advantage that new statements offer, and fail to be misclassified as true.
In any event, a dual-process account of our memory data is compatible with the more general meta-cognitive myopia framework (Fiedler, 2012) . Participants' responses could be affected by an automatic feeling of familiarity to the extent that they disregard the metainformation signaling that false statements are false. Note that the operation of the automatic component of the illusory-truth-effect is partly independent of whether participants can explicitly recall the meta-information signaling that a false statement is false (Henkel & Mattson, 2011) . Hence, it is likely that our participants misclassified false statements as true, even if the truth-value meta-information was not actually lost from their memory. Even if their memory was not impaired, however, our participants must have been myopic with respect to the meta-information signaling that false statements as false. A combination of measures of meta-information memory (cf. Experiment 2) and judgments of truth (cf.
Experiment 1) could disentangle whether participants misremember false statements as true because the meta-information is lost in their memory or because they fail to rely on it.
Understanding whether the truth-bias is due to poor memory capacities or rather due to a generalized incapacity to rely on meta-information is particularly important if we are to develop successful interventions against fake news and misinformation.
Experiment 3 suggests that the truth-bias persists in contexts with equal numbers of 35 TRUTH BIAS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISTRACTION true and false statements. It is a common assumption that in real life true information is more common than false information, which to some extent provides an evolutionary and ecological foundation for the truth-bias (Kissine & Klein, 2013; Nadarevic & Erdfelder, 2013) . On these grounds, processing fluency has been argued to be a default ecologicallyvalid cue for judgments of truth, one that can actually be used in a controlled manner (Reber & Unkelbach, 2010) . For example, in experimental contexts where processing fluency is positively linked to falsity rather than to truthfulness, fluently processed statements are judged as more false rather than more true (Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009 ). We believe that more nuance is needed in such claims. To the extent that our memory results where driven by a familiarity of processing fluency, participants in Experiment 3 have not been able to use such cues in an ecologically valid way. Experiment 3 thus, challenges the idea that people can easily adapt to a given context and switch the interpretation of familiarity and processing fluency in a controlled manner (cf. Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009 ). Experiment 4, raises an important methodological issue, as it suggests that the paradigm commonly used to test truth-bias effects may underestimate their actual magnitude.
When information is presented in chunks independent from one another it is more easily discounted. Although Fazio, Dolan, and Marsh, (2014) report that suggestibility to incorrect information increases when information is presented in lists rather than coherently, participants in those studies were given a vague warning about the existence of misinformation. In this context, participants may have better memorized incorrect statements, which in the absence of concrete meta-information may have been more believable. To the contrary, our participants had specific meta-information at their disposal informing them which statement was true and which statement was false. In the context of our studies, it may have been easier to store or retrieve the meta-information when the statements were presented individually, which in turn reduced the magnitude of the truth-bias. In any event, Experiment 36 TRUTH BIAS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISTRACTION 4 suggests that presentation mode is an important factor to take into account when assessing truth-bias effects.
To conclude, our finding that the truth-bias is independent of cognitive load and appears in its absence, undermines the "automatic belief" model advanced by Gilbert and colleagues (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, et al., 1990; 1993) . More than 20 years after these seminal studies, many scholars seem to assume that cognitive load is an important component of the truth-bias effect (e.g. Bergstrom, Moehlmann, & Boyer, 2006; Knowles & Condon, 1999; Prentice, Gerrig, & Bailis, 1997; Shrum, Wyer, & O'Guinn, 1998) . The present studies both disentangle the operation of the truth-bias from cognitive load, and provide even stronger evidence for Gilbert and colleagues' assumption that people are truth-biased towards incoming information. In fact, the results of our studies are more troubling than those of the original studies, as far as the impact of misinformation and fake news is concerned. While our materials specifically pertain to judicial contexts, the contemporary socio-political scene confirms that truth-bias effects operate across several other contexts, including the media and politics. Psychological research can help mitigate the impact of these effects in real-world settings by advancing knowledge of the cognitive processes that underpin them. Assessing, alternative explanations of the truth-bias is a significant step towards resisting 'alternative' facts.
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